Comparative risk judgments and actual risk-taking in sexual behaviours by Sultan, Serge & Jouvent, Roland
 1 
Sultan, S., Jouvent, R. (2001) Comparative risk judgments and actual risk-taking 
in sexual behaviours. International Review of Social Psychology, 14, 83-104. 
 
COMPARATIVE RISK JUDGMENTS 
AND RISK-TAKING IN SEXUAL BEHAVIOURS 
Evaluations des risques comparatifs 







titre courant: Comparative risk & risk-taking behaviours 
   Risques comparatifs & comportements à risque 
 
Key-words: Comparative risk, HIV, Optimism, Pessimism, Conditional risk. 






1 Laboratoire de Psychologie Clinique et Sociale 
Université de Bourgogne 
36, rue Chabot-Charny 
21000 Dijon 
e-mail: Serge.Sultan@u-bourgogne.fr 
Acknowledgements / Remerciements: 
Financial support for this research was given by the French Agence Nationale de 
Recherches sur le Sida (1997). 
The authors wish to thank Benjamin Bureau for his help in data collection and 











HIV infection still represents a major health problem. Risk-taking or the absence 
of precautionary behaviour is the first determinant for infection. Comparative 
risk could help explain some part of the risk-taking. However the relation to 
actual behaviour bears major methodological difficulties which we attempted to 
address here. Risk status and situation conditionality were considered as 
independent variables. Comparative risk estimates were considered dependent 
variables. Two hundred and sixty eight students were included in a correlational 
design. They filled in self-questionnaires and reported their risk status 
concerning HIV infection and comparative risk estimates for both conditional 
and unconditional risk situations. Results confirmed previous research where 
estimates varied according to risk status and conditionality was related to lower 
optimistic bias or increase pessimistic bias. When both variables are considered 
simultanously, risk-takers appraised comparative risk less pessimistically. 




L'infection au VIH représente encore un problème de santé publique majeure. La 
prise de risque ou l'absence de comportement de protection est le facteur causal 
déterminant de l'infection. Le risque perçu comparatif pourrait en partie rendre 
compte de ce facteur. Cependant la relation directe avec le comportement recèle 
des difficultés méthodologiques importantes, auxquelles nous tentons de nous 
adresser ici. Nous considérons deux variables indépendantes, le caractère à 
risque ou non des sujets et le caractère conditionnel ou non des situations 
proposées pour l'évaluation subjective des risques comparatifs. Cette dernière 
évaluation est notre variable dépendante observée. 268 étudiants ont été inclus 
dans cette étude corrélationnelle. Ils ont rempli des questionnaires auto-
administrés portant sur les comportements sexuels et des estimations de risques 
comparatifs. Les résultats confirment les recherches précédentes où l'estimation 
subjective des risques varie en fonction du caractère à risque des sujets et du 
caractère conditonnel des situations. Lorsque les deux variables indépendantes 
sont considérées simultanément, on observe que les preneurs de risque jugent 
certaines situations conditionelles de manière moins pessimiste que le reste de 






Sexual risk-taking has long been a major problem in public health. The 
individual as well as the social costs remain very high in spite of recent 
therapeutic developments. Current treatments are expensive and a part of the 
people infected by the virus have no access to it (Cohen, 1996). To understand 
sexual risk-taking, psychologists have explored various models and evidenced 
multiple correlates, although the understanding of the phenomenon still 
represents a real challenge for Health Psychology. This is why it is of major 
interest to evidence determinants and correlates of precautionary behaviours. 
The goal of this paper is to explore the relations of different comparative 
measures of perceived risk to actual behaviours. 
 
##Psychology and risk-taking behaviours 
 
Some authors addressed the question of whether risk-taking is due to an internal 
disposition (or vulnerability) of the subject to risk. There would be a 'risk-taking 
trait', stable accross various situations. This personality trait could be favored by 
psycho-biological particularities, inducing more generally stimulation or 
‘sensation seeking’ (Zaleski, 1984). This was also assumed by Wilde (1988) in 
the field of the general psychology of risk. The relevance of a disposition to risk 
was criticized by many authors in cognitive psychology (e.g. Huteau, 1985). 
According to them, risk-taking is a complex variable resulting from a 
combination of more elementary variables, which do not necessarily appear 
together (e.g. estimation of probability of success or failure, representation of 
benefits and losses and their personal meaning for the subject). Consequently 
risk-taking has been approached as a result of a decision making process. In the 
perspective of the general psychology of risk, taking a risk  has been considered 
as taking the decision of a risky alternative (Von Winterfeld, 1986). The 
normative models of the decision theory describe steps subjects are supposed to 
follow in order to maximize their chances to improve their well-being according 
to their own values and beliefs (Fischhoff, Svenson & Slovic, 1987). This 
reasoning could be applied to situations where the health of subjects is definitely 
and seriously threatened (which is the case in HIV infection). In the field of 
sexual risk, the models of Catania, Kegeles & Coates (1990) and Fisher & 
Fisher (1992) assumed that perceived vulnerability is a major determinant of 
AIDS-preventive behaviour. Yet one implicit assumption of these models is that 
people are able to adequately assess the risks associated with their behaviour. 
For long we know however that what we perceive is a distorted view. 
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The behavioral decision theory developed the concept of 'cognitive bias'. This 
helps us understand real behaviors (Slovic, Fishhoff & Lichstenstein, 1977 ; 
Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). Researchers have identified a limited 
numbers of inferential rules used by subjects in this type of situations, on which 
they rely (Fishhoff et al., 1987). These judgment rules are used to simplify 
difficult mental tasks. However, they are useful in specific circumstances, but 
induce important and persistent biases, with serious consequences on decision 
making in various areas (Slovic, Fishhoff & Lichtenstein, 1982). These biases 
may concern the availability of information and the feeling to be protected from 
various negative events or feeling of invulnerability (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981 ; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). 
Thus the scientific modeling of risk-taking can call for some conception of a 
feeling of invulnerability which would bias the accuracy of risk perception. In 
fact most models of health behaviour incorporate perceived risk as an important 
determinant of behaviour. Many authors consider that a specific form of 
optimism could account for this feeling of invulnerability (Weinstein, 1989) 
 
##Comparative optimism and HIV infection 
 
The feeling of invulnerability can be defined in terms of the subjective 
probability of becoming the victim of a disease. This is an equivalent of  one's 
perceived risk of such an event. We know however that what is perceived by the 
subject is often far from reality. The subject may not acquire the proper 
knowledge of the actual risks or he may feel motivated to play the risks down. 
For example, Taylor (1989) has shown two facets of cognitive distortions 
belonging to the broader category of defensive optimism or optimistic bias. This 
optimism about one's invulnerability could hinder the adoption and maintenance 
of preventive behaviours. First the temporal comparison bias in which people 
minimize the probability of the reoccurence of an event. In this case, people 
ignore that chance events are actually independent of each other and that the 
probability of reoccurence is exactly the same as for the first occurence. Second 
the social comparison bias that has been called 'optimistic bias' or unrealistic 
optimism (Weinstein, 1980), in which people will consider that a negative event 
may happen to others, but will not happen to them. Weinstein (1989) has shown 
that when people are asked to provide a percentage estimate of the likelihood, in 
comparison with peers, that they will someday experience an illness or injury, 
most underestimate their risks. It is now a traditional observation to note that the 
average individual sees himself or herself as below average in risk for a variety 
of health threats, which of course cannot be. 
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Weinstein (1980, 1982, 1984) and Perloff and Fetzer (1986) have found 
evidence for such a social comparison bias that reflects the difference between 
the perceived risk of oneself and the perceived risk of others within the same 
reference group. If health risks are expected to apply more to others than to 
oneself there is no reason to take preventive action. Until now, most research 
focused on the possible antecedents of unrealistic optimism and little attention 
has been paid to the possible effects of optimism on preventive health 
behaviour. It is important to remark that subjective perceptions of susceptibility 
to health risks are an important component of several theories of health 
behaviors (Janz & Becker, 1984; Rogers, 1983). These theories state that once 
people perceive themselves as being susceptible to health problems, they form 
intentions to take preventive actions or to give up risky health behaviors. In fact, 
one of the main reasons for the interest in unrealistic optimism is the assumption 
that optimistic bias may lower feelings of vulnerability and, hence, affect risk-
reduction motivation and activities (Weinstein, 1984). 
Currently very few studies are available on the measure of the optimistic bias in 
people concerned by the HIV infection. Very early in the history of HIV, 
Weinstein (1984) obtained evidence for this illusion of (relative) invulnerability. 
Taylor, Kemeny, Aspinwall et al. (1992) have explored both specific optimistic 
bias towards HIV infection and dispositional optimism in a cohort of gay men. 
They found that there was no relation of optimism to risk-related sexual 
behavior. They concluded that optimism is psychologically adaptative without 
necessarily compromising health behavior.These results led the authors to state 
that the suggestion made by Weinstein (1982) that optimism may undermine 
effective health behaviors is not supported by their data. However, some 
remarks must be made on the methods used in this study.The nature of the two 
questions was closer to an AIDS-specific optimism than an AIDS-specific 
comparative optimism, since no reference to any  social target was made in the 
questions asked. Subjects had to evaluate their chances of getting AIDS on the 
basis of the different factors that may contribute to the disease and their past and 
present behavior. Therefore any comparison with Weinstein's procedure is 
dubious. Unrealistic optimism was observed for both low and high-risk groups. 
Van der Velde et al. (1994) investigated the perception of AIDS-related risks for 
samples that differed widely in their risk status. Their findings indicated that the 
groups were aware of their relative risk status: high-risk groups gave higher 
ratings of their own risk than low-risk groups. Most important, all groups 
showed an optimistic bias and thought that their risks were lower than that of an 
average person of their age and gender. 
Various social biases can influence this optimistic bias. Weinstein (1980) 
noticed that an optimistic bias was stronger when subjects have difficulty in 
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considering concretely the victims of accidents and diseases. In that case, 
individuals rely on a stereotyped representation of these victims. Concerning 
HIV infection and AIDS, it is highly probable that this disease being related to 
highly stereotyped social categories (homosexuals, drug abusers, etc.), people 
would have the illusion they are less threatened (Paicheler, 1996). However, 
studies showed that risks which are more cognitively 'available' due to personal 
experience or media coverage tend to be overestimated (Slovic, Fischhoff & 
Lichtenstein, 1979). Thus, estimates of the likelihood of 'sensational' risks such 
as the risk of contracting AIDS or being involved in an air crash tend to be too 
high. For instance, van der Velde et al. (1994) observed that people generally 
overestimate the risk of AIDS. Hence, different factors may play contradictory 
roles on the estimation of risk. 
 
##Comparative risk judgment and preventive behaviour 
 
Results have shown that many factors play a role concerning the importance of 
the optimistic bias. Among these, two are particularly interesting from a 
decision making perspective. First it has been shown that members or risk 
popoulations do differ in terms of optimism and pessimism. van der Velde et al. 
(1994) have shown that experience reduces bias but does not eliminate it. Prior 
experience with sexual risk behaviors can indeed reduce defensive optimism. 
Moreover, persons who are objectively at risk ponder this while making 
judgments about their likelihood of contracting the HIV. In fact invulnerability 
or optimistic biases are usually higher in groups not at risk because risk-takers 
would take into consideration their actual or past behaviours to appraise their 
relative vulnerability (Weinstein, Rothman & Nicolich, 1995, cited in van der 
Pligt, 1998). This is suggested by the results of Gerrard, Gibbons & Bushman 
(1996) who investigated the relationship between perceived vulnerability to HIV 
and precautionary sexual behaviour. Prospective studies included in their 
analysis did not support the relation between perceived risk and preventive 
behaviour. So it seems that traditional unconditional comparative risk estimates 
are bad predictors of preventive health behaviour because the preventive 
behaviour itself reduces the real risk and, in this way, leads towards a justified 
increase of comparative optimism. 
 
A second factor involved consists in the nature of the concrete situation explored 
in the questions. As Schwarzer (1994) and van der Pligt (1998) noticed there are 
a wide range of methods used to assess comparative perceived risk. Several 
authors have advocated that the relations between optimism and health 
behaviours was not conclusive yet (Weintein, 1984; Schwarzer, 1994). Overall, 
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research findings suggest that the predictive power of comparative risk appraisal 
is modest. However this may be due to methodological heterogeneity and 
misinterpretation of results. For instance van der Pligt (1998) suggested that 
conditional risk should be closer to actual decision making processes and 
therefore should be preferred as opposed to unconditional situations in the 
measures used. Some support for this was found by van der Velde, van der Pligt 
& Hooijkaas (1996). Unconditional risk estimates refer to the subjective 
likelihood that a negative consequence will occur, based on whatever factors 
individuals take into account (e.g. perceptions of control, perceived afficacy of 
preventive actions, etc.). Conditional risk refers to the probability of adverse 
consequence for one's health if no preventive action is taken (or their probability 
if a specific preventive action is taken). A conditional risk estimate thus requires 
people to indicate their risk given their present behavioural practices, or changes 
in these practices. 
It is highly probable that in the case of conditional risk the results obtained 
would be far closer to a real situation than in an unconditional risk. The answers 
given by subjects are understandable in the decision-making framework. 
Whereas most models of health behaviours refer implicitly to conditional risk 
estimates, most recent research tends to rely on unconditonal risk estimates 
where it is unclear what set of factors people take into account when answering 
(Schwarzer, 1994). Therefore we should observe a difference in risk-perception 
between conditional and unconditional situations where conditional situations 
would increase the level of vulnerability when risks are already taken. Some 
authors think comparative risk appraisal serves a number of functions but does 
not seem a prime determinant of behaviour (e.g. van der Pligt, 1998). We would 
consider as a strong argument against this assertion a result where conditional 
comparative risk appraisal  would be more advantageous to the subject in high-
risk than in low-risk groups. In fact it is probable that conditionality of risk 




In general we hypothesized that people would assess their personal risk of being 
infected by HIV favorably, as compared to people of their age and gender 
(hypothesis 1). This is a consequence of the traditional empirical observation 
basing the unrealistic optimism phenomenon (Weinstein, 1989). Whereas people 
on the average tend to show an optimistic bias regarding their future health, 
there is evidence that at the individual level, this bias is attenuated according to 
individual health behaviors (van der Velde et al., 1994). For example, smokers 
give higher mean estimates of perceived susceptibility to lung cancer than non-
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smokers, although they do not arrive at 'realistic' risk jugments. In the same line, 
risky health behaviors such as unsafe sexual practices are associated with higher 
perceived susceptibility to related health problems (Taylor et al., 1992; van der 
Velde et al., 1994). In line with previous research we expected people who had 
taken risks to show a lower bias when appraising their comparative risks than 
people who had not when traditional unconditional measures were used 
(hypothesis 2). Moreover there should be a difference according to the features 
of the situation presented to subjects, the appraisal of conditional risk yielding 
less favorably biased judgments than classical unconditional measures 
(hypothesis 3). This should appear in both alternatives whether the risk is absent 
or present in past behaviour. Realizing some degree of personal vulnerability is 
a prerequisite for becoming motivated to counteract threats and to avoid risks. 
As mentioned before, perceived vulnerability to disease is understood as a major 
causal factor for adherence with health regimen. Here too a distinction should be 
made: to account for their risky behaviours we should observe more favorable 
comparative judgments in risk-takers when the risk situation is conditional 
(hypothesis 4). This comes from the observation that a conditional risk is far 
more realistic and generates concrete decision making processes in subjects. The 
basic assumption being that decision making is specific (or biased) in people 






Our sample consists in 268 sexually active students recruited at the University of 
Paris 10 - Nanterre. Their academic origins were economics, literature and law. 
These subjects were drawn from a larger sample of 345. Seventy-seven subjects 
were excluded from our analyses because they had not had any sexual activity 
during the past 12 months. Yet the latter do not differ from the 268 sample in 
gender, age or academic origin. The mean age is 21.5 yrs ( 1.8 yrs). The 
sample is composed of 124 male and 144 female students. Subjects were asked 
to fill in their self-report questionnaires individually and anonymously in a room 




We used three types of instruments although only the results of the first two are 
presented here. 
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a. A questionnaire designed to assess sexual risk-taking behaviours towards HIV 
based on the report of past behaviours. Questions were taken from the French 
National Survey on Sexual Behaviour (Spira, Bajos et al., 1993). This allowed 
us to discriminate two groups whether risk was present (so-called risk-takers) or 
absent (so-called non risk-takers) in the past 12 months, i.e. on the basis on 
subjects' risk status. A high probability of risk-taking behaviours was definied as 
corresponding to one or more of the following patterns in the past 12 months: 
-either risk factors present in the partner's general features (such as partner using 
drug injection) and no systematic use of condom with this partner. 
-or unprotected intercourse with a new partner 
-or several sexual partners and no systematic use of condom. 
Criteria for defining risk factors in partners, new partners and several sexual 
partners were taken from Spira et al. (1993). Overall this measure of risk permits 
to isolate subjects with very low-risk sexual activity from subjects with 
moderate risk to high-risk sexual activity. 
b. Five questions aiming at assessing comparative risk judgments. In the 
principle they follow Weinstein's procedure (1980). Subjects were asked to 
judge if their chances to live certain events were lower or higher as compared to 
people of their age and gender in the same situation. The response format is a 
seven-point scale where scores vary from -3 to +3. 
We used one unconditional risk situation taken from Weinstein (1987): 
Q1. "Compared to other people of your age and gender, your chances of getting 
infected by HIV in the future are: much below average (-3), below average (-2), 
a little below average (-1), average (0), a little above average (+1), above 
average (+2), much above average (+3)". This response format was kept for all 
questions. This question will be referred to in tables as HIV INFECTION 
(UNCONDITIONAL). 
We also used four conditional risk situations: 
Q2. "If you had a sexual intercourse with a new partner, without knowing 
him/her, how would you estimate your chances to be infected by HIV as 
compared to the average people of your age and gender in the same situation ?" 
Q3. "If you had several sexual partners and did not systematically use condoms, 
how would you... [cf. Q2] ?" 
Q4. "If after an unprotected sexual intercourse with an unknown partner, you 
wondered whether you had been infected by HIV, how would you... [cf. Q2] ?" 
Q5. "If you took real risks in your sexual behaviours, how would you... [cf 
Q2] ?" 
These four conditional situations will be referred to in the following tables as 
respectively NEW SEXUAL PARTNER (Q2), SEVERAL SEXUAL 
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PARTNERS (Q3), UNKNOWN SEXUAL PARTNER (Q4), ACTUAL RISKS 
(Q5). 
c. The Life Orientation Test-Revised (Scheier, Carver & Bridges, 1994) 
measuring dispositional optimism. However results concerning this will not be 




In order to explore for our hypotheses, an ANOVA and a series of Student's t-
test were processed. Results appear in Tables 1 to 3. In the total sample 
(N=268), the mean estimates of perceived comparative risk was found to be 
significantly different from zero (Table 1 and 2). Concerning the HIV infection 
(unconditional) situation, subjects judged their chances to get infected by the 
HIV as lower than the average in their gender and age reference group. Thus 
hypothesis 1 is confirmed. Rigorously we cannot speak of a proper bias without 
referring to the risk status, this appraisal may be accurate and correspond to real 
risks taken by subjects. Under conditional circumstances, subjects tend to 
appraise their chances to get infected as higher than the average subjects (Table 
1 and 2, four remaining conditions). Here however the verbing of questions 
allows no doubt on the existence of a bias in the pessimistic sense, since subjects 
were asked to compare themselves to people in the same situation i.e. having 
taken a specific risk. Thus, there was a major difference between conditional and 
unconditional situations as for comparative risk judgments. It seems that it was 
far less easy for subjects to optimistically bias their judgments in conditional 
situations. This was expected (cf. suggestions made by Van der Pligt, 1998) and 
the evidence seems quite clear. 
When the sample was splitted according to risk status based on the 12 past 
months sexual behaviour, we observed the same pattern of results in both groups 
of  non risk-takers (n=178) and risk-takers (n=90). Yet whereas a rather 
optimistic tendency was expected in non risk-takers as for the first situation 
(unconditional, see Table 1), this was not the case with risk-takers (see Table 2). 
The test for a significant difference between unconsitional risk estimates is 
available in Table 3 (first line). Our data show a clear difference in risk 
appraisal. Subjects took their previous behaviour in consideration when 
estimating probabilities of risks. This is in line with the results obtained by Van 
der Velde et al. (1994) in different samples differing on their risk status and with 
our hypothesis 2 as well. Yet as already mentionned judgments of risk-takers 
remain clearly biased. Even if subjects took into consideration their previous 
behaviours in appraising comparative risks, our results show that those taking 
risks kept thinking they were less at risk than the average others (see first 
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situation Table 2). In the non risk-takers sub-sample all conditional situations 
generated a pessimistic bias. It seems that people behaving safely tended to 
adopt a very pessimistic attitude when they were confronted with a situation 
where risk had already occurred. They thought consequences would be so bad as 
to bias their judgments in a negative way, despite the verbing of the question. 
 
[insert Table 1 and 2 about here] 
 
To test for hypothesis 3 a series of within subject comparisons were computed in 
the total sample (paired t-test). The four types of conditional estimates were 
significantly different from conditional estimates (fisrt risk situation) and were 
in all four cases less favorably biased (all ts<-15.4, df=267, p<.001). These data 
are in the expected direction. 
If we turn to the risk-takers subsample in conditional situations (Table 2), we 
observe that some situations generated a pessimistic bias where others did not. 
That is having an intercourse with a new partner (Q2) and having an unprotected 
intercourse with an unkown partner (Q4) were appraised accurately: estimates 
did not differ significantly from zero. Two situations were judged 
pessimistically: having several partners and incurring actual risks. This may be 
due to communication and general knowledge about HIV infection. Also the 
objective risk to get infected is probably proportional to the number of partners, 
involved in these conditions. This also may be a consequence of the particular 
verbing of these two questions aiming at directly confronting subjects to risks, 
as real as they can be. 
Nevertheless the main information obtained here lies in the difference between 
the two sub-samples in comparative risk appraisal. Let us now turn to Table 4 
where both groups are compared. In conditional situation where the risk is 
assumed to be already taken, risk-takers tend to appraise comparative risks less 
pessimistically than non risk-takers. This is true for one risk measure where 
subjects encountered an unkown partner and had unprotected intercourse with 
him/her. A tendency for a difference was also found for the condition where 
relationships with several sexual partners were underlined (Table 3). Thus it 
appears that all situations were not judged equally even if they all deal with the 
same risk (i.e. getting infected by HIV). Also these results show that the 
appraisal of conditional risk can be different according to risk status based on 
self-report. So hypothesis 4 is partly confirmed by our data, particularly the 
significant effect for Q4 and the marginally significant effect for Q2. The results 




[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
In addition to these analyses, we computed non-parametric statistics (Mann-
Whitney U-test) to control for a possible strong bias in variable distribution or 
outliers effects. All results obtained with Mann-Whitney U confirm previous 
analyses concerning significance range. We also compared our two groups on 
frequencies of optimists (negative estimates), realists (estimates equal to zero) 
and pessimists (positive estimates). No significant differences between risk-
takers and non risk-takers was evidenced in all four conditional situations. This 
shows that differences observed in relation to risk status as for conditional risks 
were due to higher or lower estimates within categories of optimists or 
pessimists, rather than frequency differences between optimists, realists and 
pessimists. That is why we can speak of a subtle difference between our groups. 
Yet in the unconditional general situation we observed a significant difference in 
frequencies between categories. In non-risk takers optimists were more frequent 
whereas realists were more frequent in risk-takers (Chi-square=13.398, df=2, 
p=.001). This result confirms the observation we made earlier on quantitative 
estimate difference between groups. These results are consistent with data 
published by Peeters, Cammaert & Czapinski (1997) where unconditional 
comparative risk ratings of presumably normal subjects varied between 




This study was designed to explore the links between comparative risk 
judgments and actual risk-taking, and more generally to explore possible 
determinants of comparative risk estimates. Risk status and conditionality of risk 
situations were explored. Our results confirm our hypotheses. They show that 
both types of factors may have an individual effect. First, risk status appears to 
moderate comparative risk estimates in a traditional measure of unrealistic 
optimism. This confirms previous results obtained in clinical samples (van der 
Velde et al., 1992; van der Velde et al., 1994). Second, when confronted to 
conditional situations, subjects tend to express a pessimistic bias. Whereas the 
verbing should lead them to an average answer, most people tend to think they 
have more chances than others to get infected by HIV. 
In fact the positive aspects of conditional risk for research in this field are 
numerous. It is clear that conditional risk resembles more closely the original 
notion of vulnerability found in models of health behaviors (like Rogers's, 1975 
or Becker's, 1974). This was also argued by van der Velde, van der Pligt & 
Hooijkaas (1996). 
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According to their reasoning people are inclined to take precautionnary action if 
they believe that inaction significantly increases their risk as compared to taking 
precautionary action. Thus people should perceive a high susceptibility to the 
disease given inaction. In addition, the main drawback of an unconditional 
measure of risk concerns the direction of causality between unconditional risk 
estimates and behavioural intentions. Also a conditional risk estimate seems to 
be less dependent upon differences in actual risk status (based on past behaviour 
for example), and is therefore more likely to be related to other factors in a 
consistent and interpretable manner. 
In addition, when comparing two groups with different risk status on conditional 
risk estimates (i.e. when exploring the interaction between both independent 
variables), we observed a tendency of risk-takers to be less unrealistically 
pessimistic. To interpret this results we must go back to the verbing of the two 
questions which lead to differences in that case. The first consists in the new 
sexual partner condition. In that case, it may be that subjects rely on themselves: 
the choice of the partner may appear somewhat controllable despite the 
conditional verbing of the question. This would be reflected by attitudes such as: 
"usually, I choose my partners better than others do". Studies have shown that 
various irrational criteria are taken into account by subjects to assess health 
features of the potential partner (e.g. Kegeles, Adler & Irwin, 1989). So an 
increase in illusion of control could explain the difference between groups in the 
new sexual partner situation (question 2). Controllability has long been isolated 
as a major determinant of self-favorable comparative risk appraisals in various 
fields (Delhomme, 2000). The second consists in the unknown sexual partner 
condition. Of course results can be due to media coverage and common 
knowledge on the unknown partner situation. It is remarkable in that sense that 
the several sexual partner condition did not yield any difference between groups 
in risk estimates. Theoretically yet this condition is the only one that directly 
refers to some kind of anticipation. It was designed to stress realistic aspects and 
make people concretely represent themselves having to think about a probability 
of risk. Our data show that people taking risk tend to evaluate such probabilities 
more favourably. This could be explained two ways. First people concerned by 
the risk would adopt defensive and quite strong (see significance) reactions 
which nature remains to precise. This interpretation is linked to affect regulation 
and the way subjects take into consideration anticipatory affect in their decision-
making. Richard, van der Pligt and de Vries (1996) have increased  the 
awareness that unsafe sex is likely to result in unpleasant post-behavioural 
feelings. Their manipulation of time perspective when thinking about affective 
reactions resulted in the increased salience of negative effective reactions such 
as worry and regret and also influenced expectations about future risk behaviour 
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in increasing intentions to use condoms (i.e. adopt precautionary behaviours). 
Second, the interpretation can rely on motivational factors. During the decision-
making process appraising risks less pessimistically than others would relate to 
self-protection. 
An explanation that could account for differences in pessimism between risk-
takers and non risk-takers lies in the need of subjects to maintain a positive self-
perception (self-enhancement). For risk-takers, the benefit coming from a 
downward comparison (in that case, people more at risk) would be higher than 
the benefit that an accurate information on the self would yield (Taylor, Netter 
& Wayment, 1995). For example, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon et al. 
(1995) have shown that subjects consider themselves less similar to a target if 
they learn by chance that the target suffers from a serious illness (as opposed to 
a benign illness). So, authors often suggest that this similarity bias protect the 
self against a threatening vulnerability. 
If so we should observe a higher tendency to protect themselves by increased 
optimism in vulnerable people. Some support to this was found in the field of 
non-adherence in heart-disease patients showing some signs of depression 
(Sultan, Bungener & Andronikof, in press). 
In order to consider the threat and adopting corrective actions (i.e. precautionary 
health behaviors), the subjects would need specific resources. This was partly 
demonstrated by results showing difficulties in adopting protective actions and 
adhering to treatment or regimen in depressed or anxious patients (Sultan et al., 
in press). In some patients, the state of resources and emotions would not allow 
the individual to cope with additionnal difficulty since it would be contrary to 
the normative rule of maximizing their well-being. 
 
However in both conditions leading to differences between groups an alternative 
interpretation can be called for. It seems that conditional risk increasing reality 
in simulation increases also anxiety or negative affect. Some support for this can 
be found in the results obtained here according to which specific conditional 
situations clearly lead to pessimistic bias, be it the verbing of questions. This is 
particularly true in people with no risky behaviours. Therefore it is tempting to 
interpret differences between our groups as a lower sensibility to anxiety in risk-
takers, i.e. as specific features in risk estimation correlates responsible for the 
risk status. In fact other analyses have revealed that a negative or positive 
affectivity could be related to comparative risk appraisals (Sultan & Bureau, 
1999). This is in line with explanations of perceived invulnerability which tend 
to focus on the need to reduce feelings of fear and anxiety. As noticed by Van 
der Pligt (1998), support for the role of these mechanisms is provided by 
research showing more biased risk estimates in situations of increased threat. 
 15 
For instance, Bauman & Siegel (1987) showed that men with a risky life-style 
who deny or underestimate their risk of an HIV infection also experienced lower 
anxiety. 
This possible motivational explanation of optimism (optimism as a way to 
reduce fear) was also suggested by Weinstein (1980). He noted that if optimism 
was found to increase with event seriousness, this would point to an ego-
defensive origin of optimism. Some support for this was found by van der 
Velde, van der Pligt & Hooijkaas (1992). 
In summary methodological issues raised in the introduction of this paper have 
only been partly addressed. Limits of our work primarily concern its 
correlational design. To bring more solid evidence on the causal relation of 
conditional risk to actual risky behaviours and confirm our conclusive 
assumptions an experimental design should be preferred in future research. Also 
a possible order effect between measures cannot be discarded. Although two 
different versions of the questionnaires were used (unconditional or conditional 
risk placed first), this effect could not be assessed for practical reasons. Under 
these circumstances it is probable that if such an effect existed, it was 
counterbalanced, though we cannot be sure of it.. Our data suggest that 
comparative risk appraisal may explain some part of the variance of risk-taking 
and therefore should qualify the common opinion that comparative optimism 
does not really account for actual risk-taking (van der Pligt, 1998). This would 
be however, only provided that simulations place subjects in a most real 
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Mean and Standard Deviation of Comparative Risk Appraisal for NON RISK-
TAKERS (n = 178) 
Moyenne et Ecarts-types de l'évaluation des risques comparatifs pour les non 
preneurs de risque (n = 178) 
 
Comparative Risk Questions 
 
M SD t  p 
 









NEW SEXUAL PARTNER 0.315 1.037 4.047 <0.001 
SEVERAL SEXUAL PARTNERS 0.747 1.310 7.611 <0.001 
UNKNOWN SEXUAL PARTNER 0.446 1.102 5.388 <0.001 
ACTUAL RISKS 
 
0.672 1.241 7.208 <0.001 
 
Note. t and p values refer to a two-tailed Student's t-test of a comparison to a 
theoretical mean (=0). Comparative Risk Appraisal was assessed by a 7-points 
scale where negative values mean less chances and positive values mean more 
chances than the average of people. Zero means as many chances. 
Note. t et p se réfèrent à un test de Student bilatéral d'une comparaison à une 
moyenne théorique (=0). L'évaluation des risques comparatifs s'est faite par une 
échelle en 7 points où les valeurs négatives signifient moins de risques et les 




Mean and Standard Deviation of Comparative Risk Appraisal for RISK-
TAKERS (n = 90) 
Moyenne et Ecarts-types de l'évaluation des risques comparatifs pour les 
preneurs de risque (n = 90) 
 
Comparative Risk Questions 
 
M SD t  p 
 









NEW SEXUAL PARTNER 0.089 0.907 0.929 0.355 
SEVERAL SEXUAL PARTNERS 0.633 1.302 4.614 <0.001 
UNKNOWN SEXUAL PARTNER 0.156 0.820 1.800 0.075 
ACTUAL RISKS 
 
0.533 1.201 4.212 <0.001 
 
Note. t and p values refer to a two-tailed Student's t-test of a comparison to a 
theoretical mean (=0). Comparative Risk Appraisal was assessed by a 7-points 
scale where negative values mean less chances and positive values mean more 
chances than the average of people. Zero means as many chances. 
Note. t et p se réfèrent à un test de Student bilatéral d'une comparaison à une 
moyenne théorique (=0). L'évaluation des risques comparatifs s'est faite par une 
échelle en 7 points où les valeurs négatives signifient moins de risques et les 





ANOVA Comparison of Comparative Risk Appraisal Between the Two Groups, 
NON RISK-TAKERS versus RISK-TAKERS (N = 268) 
Comparaison par ANOVA des évaluations de risques comparatifs chez les deux 
groupes non preneurs de risques versus preneurs de risques (N = 268) 
 


































NEW SEXUAL PARTNER 0.315 1.037  0.089 0.907 3.105 0.079 
SEVERAL SEXUAL 
PARTNERS 
0.747 1.310  0.633 1.302 0.398 0.529 
UNKNOWN SEXUAL 
PARTNER 
0.446 1.102  0.156 0.820 4.887 0.028 
ACTUAL RISKS 
 
0.672 1.241  0.533 1.201 0.765 0.383 
Note. F and p values refer to an ANOVA where risk status is the factor and 
comparative risk estimates are dependent variables. Non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U gives same results. 
Note. F et p se réfèrent à une ANOVA où le facteur est la prise de risque et les 
évaluations subjectives de risques comparatifs sont les variables dépendantes. Le 
test non paramétrique de Mann-Whitney donne les mêmes résultats. 
 
 
